Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2017

Michael Furness, Petitioner, v. Utah State Board of Education,
Respondent. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull; Tracey M. Watson; Karthik Nadesan; attorneys for appellant.
Erin T. Middleton, J. Bryan Quesenberry, Stanford E. Purser, Sean D. Reyes; attorneys for
appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Furness v. Utah State Board of Education, No. 20170444 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2017).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4092

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Michael Furness,

Petitioner,
V.

No. 20170444-CA

Utah State Board of Education,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
On petition for review from the Utah State Board of Education
UPPAC Case No. 15-1310

Julie J . Nelson
ErinB. Hull
Zimmerman Booher
341 S. Main St., Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 11
jnelson@zjbappeals.com
ehull@zjbappeals.com
Tracey M. Watson
Utah Education Associat ion
875 Pontiac Drive, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
tracey.watson@myuea.org
Karthik Nadesan
Nadesan Beck P .C.
8 East Broadway, Suite 625
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
karthik@nadesanbeck.com
Attorneys for Petitioner

Erin T. Middleton (10666)
Assist ant Solicitor General
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156)
Assist ant Attorney General
Stanford E. Purser (13440)
Deputy Solicitor General
Sean D. Reyes (7969)
Utah Attorney General
PO Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
801-366-0533
emiddleton@agutah.gov
bquesenberry@agutah.gov
spurser@agutah.g'tv
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COtRJS

JAN }~ ?Olf
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CURRENT AND FORMER PARTIES
Appellate Court Parties and Counsel
Petitioner's Counsel:

Petitioner:

Julie J. Nelson
Erin B. Hull
Tracey M. Watson
Karthik Nadesan

Michael Furness

Respondent's Counsel:

Respondent:

Erin T. Middleton
J. Bryan Quesenberry
Stanford E. Purser

Utah State Board of Education
vi)

Administrative Parties
There were no parties to the agency proceedings who are not also
parties to this petition for review.
~

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CURRENT AND FORMER PARTIES ................................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................. 13
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... ............ 17
I.

The Agency Followed Applicable Administrative Rules ........................ 18
A. The detailed hearing report adequately informs Teacher why
he is being disciplined......................................................................... 18
B. Teacher's license is suspended for "not less than" 3 years ............... 25
C. The superintendent's review did not violate any rules
or due process ...................................................................................... 27
D. Teacher fails to show any harm from the alleged rules
violations ............................................................................................. 29

II.

Teacher's Arguments About the Employee Discipline Test
Are Wrong or Not Preserved................................................................... 31
A. The Employee Discipline Test does not apply to Board
disciplinary decisions .......................................................................... 31
B. Teacher does not show the Board's decision fails the Employee
Discipline Test, even if it applied....................................................... 35

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. Teacher failed to preserve his arguments about UPPAC
discovery responses ............................................................................. 36
D. If Teacher preserved the discovery issue, the Board agrees to
produce some comparator information on limited remand .............. 38
III. Addressing the Superintendent's Review Process Would Be
an Advisory Opinion ................................................................................ 41
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 44
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................. 45
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 46

uP

Ill

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
2009 UT 36, 211 P.3d 382 .............................................................................. 37
Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake,
2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 ............................................................................ 29
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.,
966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998) ............................................................................... 38
Bagley v. Bagley,
2016 UT 48, 387 P.3d 1000 ............................................................................ 28
Burgess v. Dep't of Corr.,
2017 UT App 186, 405 P.3d 937 .................................................................... 31
Clegg v. Wasatch Cty.,
2010 UT 5, 227 P.3d 1243 .......................................................................... 4, 41
Davis v. Davis,
2011 UT App 311, 263 P.3d 520 .................................................................... 31
Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
2009 UT 71, 222 P .3d 55 ................................................................................ 37
Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) ........................................................................................ 28
Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Prof'l Licensing,
810 P .2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ................................................................ 22
Hennigh v. City of Shawnee,
155 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................... 18
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City,
2013 UT App 278, 316 P.3d 979 .................................................................... 30

lV

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In re P.D.,
2013 UT App 162,306 P.3d 817 .............................................................. 29, 30
In re Worthen,
926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) ............................................................................... 18
Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Div. of Sec. of Dept. of Commerce of State of Utah,
829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ................................................................ 22
Kelly v. Salt Lake Civ. Serv. Comm 'n,
2000 UT App 235, 8 P .3d 1048 ................................................................ 32, 39
~

LeBeau v. State,
2014 UT 39,337 P.3d 254 .............................................................................. 32
\19

Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n,
949 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) .......................................................... 30, 32
Neese v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole,
2017 UT 89, 854 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 .............................................................. 29

vi

Nelson v. City of Orem,
2013 UT 53, 309 P.3d 237 ....................................................................... passim
Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs.,
1999 UT App 222, 984 P .2d 399 ...................................................................... 4
Par Elec. v. Labor Comm 'n,
2017 UT App 169, 405 P.3d 842 .................................................................... 26
Pi,ckett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce,
858 P .2d 187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ................................................................ 39
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson,
2004 UT 14, 86 P.3d 735 ................................................................................ 41
Schroeder Investments, L.C. v. Edwards,
2013 UT 25, 301 P .3d 994 .............................................................................. 43

i:JJ

Sorge v. Office of Atty. Gen.,
2006 UT App 2, 128 P .3d 566 ........................................................................ 32
V

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State ex rel. E.R.,
2001 UT App 66, 21 P.3d 680 ........................................................................ 38
State in Interest of A.R.,
2017 UT App 153, 402 P .3d 206 .............................................................. 30, 31
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah,
904 P .2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ................................................................ 42
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.,
786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990) ............................................................................. 21
Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union,
2012 UT 75, 289 P.3d 582 .............................................................................. 41
Vance v. Fordham,
671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983) ............................................................................... 22
West Valley City v. Coyle,
2016 UT App 149, 380 P .3d 327 .................................................................... 32
Yardley v. Utah Dep't of Corr.,
2006 UT App 49, 2006 WL 350203 ................................................................ 30
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988) ............................................................................... 21
Constitution
Utah Const. art. X, § 3 ....................................................................................... 17

Statutes
2015 Utah Laws 1710 ........................................................................................ 33
Utah Code § 53A-6-102 ...................................................................................... 17
l.[tah Code § 53A-6-307 .................................................................... 17, 26, 34, 42
Utah Code § 53A-6-307 (2014) .......................................................................... 34

VI

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code § 53A-6-501 ................................................................................ 17, 34
Utah Code § 53A-6-501 (2014) .............................................................. 17, 22, 33
Utah Code § 63G-4-403 ...................................................................................... 32

Rules
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(b) ........................................................... 45
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(g) ........................................................... 45
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(g)(l) ...................................................... 45

Regulations
Utah Admin. Code R277-210-2 ......................................................................... 40
Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13 ................................................................ passim
Utah Admin. Code R277-213-2 ......................................................................... 27
Utah Admin. Code R277-515-3 ............................................................... 9, 11, 22

Vil

vi)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INTRODUCTION
The Utah State Board of Education ("Board") has the constitutional
authority to oversee the public education of Utah's children. This is one of the
01

most important functions of state government. High quality teachers are
essential to that mission. For this reason, the legislature tasked the Board
with setting educator licensure requirements. This includes the authority and
discretion to discipline licensees and, when necessary, to revoke or suspend
licenses.
The Board properly exercised that discretion here. After a thorough
hearing process, the agency factfinder determined that Petitioner ("Teacher")
had: dunked or held a thirteen-year old autistic student ("Student") under
water on ten different occasions to punish or gain compliance, locked Student
in darkened rooms by the pool at least five times, and demeaned and created
an intimidating and insulting atmosphere for staff.
On review to this Court, Teacher wisely does not challenge the fact
findings about his conduct. Instead, he tries to discredit the decisionmakers.
He says the decisions at three levels of administrative review did not
technically comply with administrative rules, that inadequate agency
discovery responses prevented him from showing his discipline was

1
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inconsistent, and that this Court should clarify the superintendent review
process.
All of these arguments lack merit. The relevant decisions comply with
applicable rules and amply explain why and under what standards Teacher is
being disciplined. The discipline complies with any appropriate test, and
Teacher has waived any argument that agency discovery responses hamper
his arguments. Finally, commenting on the superintendent review process
would be pointless under the circumstances and amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion.

2
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether the hearing report, the superintendent's review, or
the Board's decisions violated applicable administrative rules?

Standard of Review: The Board agrees that its application of its own
rules is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality. Pet. Br. at 2.

Preservation: The Board does not dispute that this issue was
preserved. Pet. Br. at 2.

Issue 2: Whether Teacher preserved his argument that inadequate
agency discovery responses preclude him from showing his discipline is
inconsistent?

Standard of Review: This preservation question arises for the first
time on appeal so there is no underlying determination to review.

Preservation: Preservation questions arise for the first time on
appeal.

Issue 3: Whether the Court should issue an advisory opinion about the
superintendent's review despite the lack of any actual dispute about this
issue.

Standard of Review: Courts avoid issuing decisions where a
controversy has "not yet sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal
rights" between parties or where there only exists "a difference of opinion
regarding the hypothetical application" of a law to a situation in which the
3
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parties might find themselves at some future time. Clegg v. Wasatch Cty.,
2010 UT 5,

1 26, 227 P.3d 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). To do so

would be to "impermissibly render an advisory opinion." Id.

Preservation: Teacher appealed to the superintendent, so there was
no disputed issue to preserve.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Teacher worked as a physical education instructor and coach at Kearns
High School and Eisenhower Junior High School, in Granite School District,
before retiring in 2002. [R.262.] After a short-lived retirement, Teacher began
teaching physical education at Hartvigsen School in approximately 2004. [Id.]
Hartvigsen School is a K-12 school in Granite School District for
developmentally disabled students. [R.268.] Beginning in 2013, Teacher was
in charge of the swimming pool and had four para-professional staff members
to assist him. [R.269.]

Difficulties Begin
In November 2014, Teacher pushed a student down on a bench, tapped
the student on the head with a water bottle, and poked the student in the

Teacher does not challenge the underlying findings of fact from the UPPAC
hearing report. The Board cites to them accordingly. Nelson v. City of Orem,
2013 UT 53, ,r 3 n.1, 309 P.3d 237; Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dep't of
Workforce Servs., 1999 UT App 222, 1 2, 984 P.2d 399.
1

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

chest with his finger. [R.263.] In response to this incident, the principal
ls

issued a warning letter to Teacher, stating his actions violated Granite
School District policies and constituted inappropriate conduct with a student.
[R.264, 633.] After this incident, Teacher made a sign with the large letters
"BK," which stood for "Be Kind," and hung the sign above the clock in the
pool area as a reminder to the adults to be kind. [R.264.]
Teacher received a second warning letter in May 2015 when he and
another staff member left the school for several hours. [R.266-68.] Teacher
lJ

made no arrangement for coverage in the pool or elsewhere, so other staff
members were left to address the situation. [R.267.] The principal sent
Teacher an email requesting an explanation and specifically directed Teacher
not to discuss the situation with other staff. [R.267, 636.] Teacher
nonetheless contacted other employees about the incident. [R.268, 637.] The
principal's warning letter cited Teacher for being out of the building during
instructional hours, failing to accurately report his time, and violating the
principal's directive not to contact employees about the incident. [R.268, 637.]

Excessive Student Discipline
Around this same time, in April 2015, the principal heard reports that
~

Teacher acted inappropriately toward Student, a non-verbal, autistic 13-yearold male. [R.270-71.] Student was fairly large for his age, had significant
behavioral problems, and sometimes acted out by hitting or kicking. [R.270.]
5
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When Student misbehaved, Teacher frequently dunked Student under the
water in an attempt to punish or gain compliance. [R.271, 285.] Each time,
Student would typically be under the water for a few seconds. [R.272.] During
the dunkings, Teacher would tell Student "we don't hit" or "we don't kick."
[R.272] These dunkings happened at least ten and perhaps as many as
twenty times. [R.272, 285.] Witnesses described Student as fearful, or crying
and agitated after the dunkings, and that he didn't like them. [R.272, 274.]
Staff members also saw Teacher lock Student in a room by the pool for
two or three minutes. [R.273.] This happened at least five times. [R.286.] On
each occasion, Student pounded or kicked the door, and made noises hoping
to be let out. [R.273.]

Harassing and Intimidating Conduct Towards Staff
During the same time period, Teacher began harassing and
intimidating behavior towards staff members. For example, on one occasion
when Student was misbehaving, a staff member tried calming Student down.
[R.282.] Student kicked the staff member in the knee causing him to fall
down. [Id.] Teacher then called the staff member a "pussy." [R.282.]
On another occasion, Teacher sprayed cold water from a hose on
several staff members and students sitting in the hot tub, including spraying
them directly in the face. [R.266.] Teacher kept spraying despite their

6
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negative reactions. [Id.] He stopped only after being warned that the cold
water could cause a student to have a seizure. [Id.]
Teacher also occasionally spoke to a staff member about his excessive
weight. [R.282.] Sometimes this was done aggressively. [Id.]
At some point, Teacher hung another sign by the pool that contained
the letters WFR, PY, DNLAM, and KAGA. [R.264, 635.] These acronyms,
known among pool staff and others, stood for Watch For Rats, Protect
Yourself, Do Not Leave A Mark, and Know A Good Attorney. [R.264-65.]
Teacher also frequently spoke to his staff about "rats" and that what
happened at the pool should stay at the pool. [R.265.] He often made similar
remarks about his resentment of staff members who would take issues and
events in the pool to school administration. [Id.]
Altogether, Teacher's signs, frequent talk about "rats," heavy-handed
humor, and frequently expressed anger, created a culture of fear and
intimidation around the pool-an area one witness said was "filled with
wJ

animosity." [R.265, 283.]

School District Investigation
After the 2014-15 school year, the principal received signed witness
statements regarding Teacher's treatment of Student. [R.279.] Teacher
responded to the allegations and the principal decided the matter should be
handled by the school district. [R.279-80.] The district then notified Teacher
7
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that he was being investigated for inappropriate contact and communication
to a student and staff. [R.280, 643-44.] Teacher promptly called a staff
meeting. [R.281.] He read the District allegations to the staff and asked them

if they had seen the conduct. [R.281.] Teacher was angry, loud, and
aggressive. [Id.] When two staff member said they had seen the improper
conduct, Teacher became even angrier. [R.281.]
After the staff meeting, the principal gave Teacher a letter asking him
to explain why he called and what was discussed at the meeting. [R.281.]
Rather than provide a meaningful response, Teacher angrily scribbled on the
letter: ''We were being transparent. This is my written response!"·[R.281-82.]
Concerned that Teacher was impeding the investigation, the District placed
him on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of the investigation.
[R.652.]
Teacher resigned soon thereafter. [R.284.] But the intimidating conduct
did not necessarily end. The following year, Teacher wrote a note to a staff
member stating "I have received a copy of all your correspondence with [the
principal]. I hope your son who coaches and teaches never has an associatefriend write letters against him." [Id.] The note was followed by a handdrawn frowning-face emoji. [R.284.] The staff member was confused and
upset by this message, which she construed as vaguely threatening. [Id.]

8
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UPPAC's Investigation and Complaint
~

Based on information it had received, the Utah Professional Practices
Advisory Commission ("UPPAC") informed Teacher in November 2015 that it
was investigating allegations he used unnecessary force with a special needs
Student during the 2014-15 school year and that he could be disciplined. [R.34.] Several months later, the investigator issued a report concluding that
Teacher had dunked an autistic Student under water to calm him down on at
least ten occasions and had put the same Student in a small, darkened room
at least six times. [R.5.] The report noted the presumptive penalty for this
conduct was a one-to-three-year suspension. [Id.]
The investigative report led to an official complaint being filed with
UPPAC against Teacher. [R.11-15.] The complaint stated the allegations of
misconduct: dunking an autistic Student at least ten times to get him to calm
\Ji)

down; bending the Student's wrist and fingers to get him to calm down;
putting the Student in a small, darkened room with the door closed on
several occasions; and harassing, insulting, and intimidating staff members.
[R.11-12.] The complaint then listed sixteen professional standards, with
specific citations to the applicable rules, that Teacher's conduct violated.
[R.12-13 (citing provisions of Utah Admin. Code R277-515-3 to -6).] Teacher
denied the allegations [R.16-20.] and the matter proceeded to discovery and
4<i:J

the hearing.
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Discovery, Hearing, and the Hearing Report
During discovery, Teacher requested detailed information about any
Granite School District employee disciplined since 2013 for inappropriate
discipline or treatment of Students, or harassing, insulting or intimidating
behavior. [R.30.] He also requested all UPPAC case and evidence files on
UPPAC investigations of educators disciplined for similar conduct during the
prior three years. [R.30.] In response, UPPAC produced two newsletters
containing summaries of Board disciplinary decisions during 2016. [R.64-72.]
Teacher's attorney emailed UPPAC's counsel thanking him for the 2016
summaries and asking for summaries for 2014 and 2015. [R.521.] UPPAC's
attorney responded that there were no summaries for those years. [R.520.]
After that, Teacher left this discovery issue alone. He never raised UPPAC's
discovery response with the hearing officer or otherwise sought to compel
complete answers to these discovery requests.
The UPPAC hearing panel conducted a hearing on February 1 and 2,
2017. [R.725.] Teacher was represented by counsel and the panel heard
testimony from several witnesses, including Teacher. [R. 725-26 (and
accompanying hearing transcripts).]
The hearing officer subsequently issued the hearing report on February
10, unanimously approved by the panel. [R.261-90.] The detailed report
contained 137 fact findings covering Teacher's teaching career and his
10
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~

conduct regarding Student and staff. [R.262-85.] In the conclusions of law
section, the hearing report summarized the facts and determined they proved
the allegations from the complaint that Teacher: held Student under water at
~

least ten different times to punish him or gain compliance, locked Student in
a bathroom or storage room by the pool for several minutes at least five
times, and created an atmosphere of intimidation and insult. [R.285-86.] The
hearing report then specifically identifies thirteen professional standards
from Utah Administrative Code R277-515 that educators must obey and

vi

concludes that Teacher "violated the terms of Utah Admin. R. 277-515 based
upon the conduct with Student and staff members that has been found to
have occurred." [R.286-87.] The hearing report also concludes that Teacher
violated district and statutory prohibitions against corporal punishment
along with other district policies. [R.287 .]
After the conclusions of law, the hearing report offers a recommended
punishment. [R.287-89.] The report discusses mitigating and aggravating

liJ)

circumstances surrounding Teacher's conduct and concludes that any one of
the incidents-dunking Student in the pool or locking him in a roomconstitutes a '"single egregious incidents [sic.] of excessive physical force or
discipline"' that warrants discipline. [R.288.] Though not referenced, the
report was quoting from the disciplinary presumptions for a one- to threeyear suspension. Based on all of the facts and circumstances, the hearing
11
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panel felt discipline should be "at the high end of the suggested range" and
ultimately recommended suspension of "not less than" three years. [R.288,
289.]
The following week, UPPAC approved the hearing report's
"recommendation of a three (3) year suspension." [R.291.] UPPAC
subsequently forwarded its recommendation to suspend Teacher's license for
"no less than three (3) years" to the Board. [R.292.]

Superintendent Review
In early April, nearly two months after the hearing report, Teacher
filed a request for review with the superintendent as authorized by
administrative rules. [R.297-378.] Superintendent review is limited to
questions of fairness or violations of due process. Utah Admin. Code R277212-13(6)(c). Furness's request included lengthy arguments, [R.297-378],
even though the administrative rule states that the request for review shall
consist of the appellant's name, position, address, and signature, and also
"the issue being appealed," Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13(6)(c). The UPPAC
Attorney filed a response with arguments on April 14. [R.379-403.] Five days
later, the superintendent notified Teacher that she disagreed with his
arguments and found "that no procedural error has occurred." [R.404.]
Two weeks later, Teacher objected to the superintendent's decision and
argued that UPPAC shouldn't have filed a response, the superintendent
12
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shouldn't have considered it, or Teacher should have been allowed to file a
reply. [R.406-08.] But no one had ever told Teacher he couldn't file a reply
before the superintendent's decision.
~

The Board's Decision
By letter dated May 19, 2017, the superintendent informed Teacher
that the Board had taken formal action at its May 5th meeting to suspend his

\.:9

license "for a period of not less than three (3) years" based on UPPAC's
recommendation. [R.293.] The letter included the notification of invalidation
of educator license to be sent to all Utah school districts and charter schools
that also stated that Teacher was suspended and could apply for
reinstatement in "not less than three (3) years." [R.295.]
Teacher timely filed a petition for review. [R 409-11.]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Neither the hearing panel, the superintendent, nor the Board
violated their own administrative rules. Teacher first argues the hearing
~

report fails to provide necessary conclusions of law, statements of relevant
precedent or applicable rules, and the disciplinary presumptions the panel
relied on. Reading the lengthy hearing report in context dispels this
argument. The complaint summarizes the factual allegations against Teacher
and states sixteen professional standards his alleged conduct violates. After

13
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exhaustively reciting the factual findings, the hearing report in turn
concludes that several fact allegations from the complaint were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. The hearing report then states that educators
are bound by the standards found in Utah Administrative Code R277-515
and specifically lists thirteen of those standards (all of which were also listed
in the complaint as standards that Teacher had violated). The hearing report
then concludes that Teacher violated R277-515.
Turning to recommended discipline, the hearing report discusses
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, concludes Teacher's discipline
should be on the high end of the range for his presumed discipline, quotes
directly from the presumption for a one to three-year suspension, and then

~

recommends a suspension of not less than three years.
After all of that, it's impossible to believe that Teacher does not
understand why he's being disciplined. The hearing report makes sufficient
conclusions of law regarding the standards Teacher violated, summarizes
those standards, and quotes from the presumption range applied. The report
does not cite to relevant precedent but that's required only if it's available,
which it's not here.
Likewise, Teacher has no legitimate complaint that he doesn't know the
length of his suspension. Only the Board imposes discipline, so any
arguments about allegedly confusing UPPAC recommendations are
14
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irrelevant. The Board suspended Teacher's license for "not less than" three
years before he could seek a reinstatement hearing and satisfy other
reinstatement requirements. This isn't confusing. The Board can't suspend a
v,

license for just three years (or any other finite time period) because the
license remains suspended until the educator successfully completes the
reinstatement process.
Teacher also argues that the superintendent should not have
considered UPPAC's response to his request for review. But the rules don't
forbid a response (they don't mention it all), and Teacher's contention that
the process was unfair is not consistent with his assertion that UPPAC
should not be allowed to respond. A fair process allows both sides to be heard.
2. Teacher argues that his suspension fails an employee discipline test
he imports from other contexts, and the agency's incomplete discovery
answers prevented him from showing his suspension is inconsistent with
prior Board disciplinary actions. But neither the prior nor current version of
the statute governing Board discipline support Teacher's proposed test. At
most, the current statute allows the Board to impose a range of specific
sanctions, including suspensions, and any "other action the board finds to be

(d

appropriate for and consistent with the educator's behavior." Any statutory
test for consistency is with the educator's conduct, not prior Board discipline
of other educators.
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Regardless, Teacher doesn't show his suspension fails his employee
discipline test. And he failed to preserve his argument that the agency's
inadequate discovery responses prevented him from showing inconsistency.
Should the Court find that Teacher actually preserved this discovery
argument, however, the Board recognizes that the abuse of discretion
standard applied to its disciplinary decisions may entail a consistency-withprior-discipline component. Under these narrow circumstances, Teacher
should thus be permitted to discover at least some comparator information.
He does not, however, need every document or piece of evidence in the
Board's files. At most, he needs the investigative report, the stipulated
discipline agreement or hearing report, and the Board's final disposition. If
Teacher preserved this argument, the Court should reverse the Board's
decision and remand so Teacher can discover the information and present his
consistency arguments for consideration.
3. Finally, Teacher requests Court guidance on the superintendent
review process. That question is moot and immaterial because it doesn't
affect the outcome of this current dispute. The Court should decline to issue
an advisory opinion on this topic.
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ARGUMENT
The legislature has declared that educating children "is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments" and that "the high
quality of teachers is absolutely essential" to assure educational excellence.
Utah Code § 53A-6-102(1)(a) and -(2)(a)(ii). The Board is constitutionally
charged with overseeing this mission. Utah Const. art. X, § 3. One of its
primary duties is exercising licensing authority over Utah educators,
including disciplining educators who violate standards of ethical conduct,
vi

performance, or professional competence. Utah Code § 53A-6-307; id. § 53A-6501(1)(a); id. § 53A-6-50l(l)(a)(i) (2014).
The legislature granted the Board wide discretion in exercising its
disciplinary function. The Board is authorized to impose a range of sanctions,
from warnings to revocation to other action it deems appropriate. Id. § 53A-6501(5). To guide the exercise of this discretion, the Board has adopted a set of
presumptions to determine appropriate discipline. [R.401-03.]; Pet.
Addendum ("Add.") D. The Board's rules also permit UPPAC to recommend
or the Board to impose enhanced or reduced sanctions based on mitigating or .
aggravating circumstances. Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13(7)(1)(e)
(requiring UPPAC to identify aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Id.
R277-212-13(7)(c) (stating Board should specify reasons, including
presumptions and aggravating and mitigating factors considered, if it rejects
17
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UPPAC's hearing report). In reviewing whether the Board appropriately
exercised its discretion, these statutes and rules must guide this Court's
review. Nelson v. City of Orem, 2013 UT 531 29, 309 P.3d 237 (holding
court's appellate review is governed by the agency's statute).
Nothing Teacher argues shows the Board abused its discretion or
violated due process in suspending his license.

I.

The Agency Followed Applicable Administrative Rules.
Teacher begins by arguing that UPPAC, the superintendent, and the
Board failed to follow various administrative rules. These claims all fail on
the merits and Teacher never shows how the alleged procedural errors
caused an erroneous outcome. 2

A.

The detailed hearing report adequately informs
Teacher why he is being disciplined.

Teacher claims that the hearing report violates administrative rule
R277-212-13(1)(a)-(d) because the report lacks conclusions of law based on

2

Teacher is wrong to the extent he argues or suggests that rule violations
constitute due process violations. The "failure to comply with state or local
.procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due
process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls
short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause." Hennigh v. City of
Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Those standards are generally "timely and adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853,
876 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the evidence, statements of relevant precedent and applicable law, and the
presumptions UPPAC applied. Pet. Br. at 13-17. These alleged "glaring
omission[s]" purportedly make it "impossible" for Teacher to know why his
license was suspended. Pet. Br. at 15. These arguments are hard to take
seriously, especially from a career educator with a master's degree. The
hearing report complies with the administrative rules and amply explainsparticularly read in context with the complaint to which the report
repeatedly refers-the reasons and bases for Teacher's discipline.
vJ

The complaint begins by summarizing the factual allegations against
Teacher, including grabbing and dunking under water an autistic Student at
least 10 times; putting the Student in a small room several times while
turning the lights off and closing the door; and harassing, insulting, and
intimidating staff members. [R.11-12.] The complaint then states that
licensed educators must abide by the standards in administrative rule R277515 and specifically identifies and quotes sixteen of those standards that
Teacher's conduct violated. [R.12-13.]
Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the hearing report
recites 137 findings of fact over the course of 25 pages detailing Teacher's
conduct. [R.261-85.] The hearing report also outlines several "conclusions of
law" based on the fact findings. The first few conclusions summarize the
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factual findings and announce the corresponding allegations from the
complaint that were proven by a preponderance of the evidence:
Teacher "repeatedly laid hands on [Student] and held him under
water to either punish or gain compliance ... on at least ten
occasions. Paragraph 4 of the Complaint has been established by
a preponderance of the evidence." [R.285.]
Teacher "repeatedly locked [Student] in the bathroom and
storage room" by the pool "and left him in the room for several
minutes on each occasion. This occurred on at least five occasions.
Paragraph 6 of the Complaint has been established by a
preponderance of the evidence." [R.286.]
Teacher "repeatedly called staff members, administrators, and
others 'rats,' and demeaned them, expressed his anger towards
them, and created and atmosphere of intimidation and insult."
He also called "a fellow staff member a 'pussy' .... Paragraph 7
of the Complaint has been established by a preponderance of the
evidence." [R.286.]
The subsequent conclusions of law expressly identify the applicable
. standards governing Teacher's conduct and the specific standards he
violated. [R.286-87 .] For instance, the report states that "Licensed educators
are required by law to conform and adhere to the effective educator's
standards contained in Utah Admin. R. R277-515" and then expressly
outlines thirteen specific standards [R.286-87] out of the dozens contained in
the rule. The very next paragraph concludes that Teacher "violated the terms
of Utah Admin. R. R277-515 based upon the conduct with [Student] and staff
members that has been found to have occurred." [R.287 .]
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Despite all of that, Teacher still professes confusion about the reasons
for his suspension. He first complains that the hearing report mislabels some
fact findings as conclusions of law. Pet. Br. at 14-15. Even if true, that's
irrelevant. Appellate courts have long disregarded the labels attached to
findings and conclusions and instead looked to the substance. State v. Rio

Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Zions First Nat'l Bank v.
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). And there is more
than enough legal substance and conclusions in the hearing report.
Teacher next complains the hearing report didn't cite relevant
precedent. Pet. Br. at 14. But the administrative rule only requires "a
~

statement of relevant precedent, if available:" Utah Admin. Code R277-21213(1)(b) (emphasis added). Teacher does not point to and the Board is not
aware of any available, relevant precedent that should have been cited. He
also claims the hearing report lacks a statement of the applicable law or rule.
Pet. Br. at 14. Yet the report expressly declares that Teacher's conduct is
I

vJ

governed by and violated Utah Administrative Code R277-515. [R.286-87.]3
He then argues that this "does not suffice to inform [him] which offense he is

Teacher argues that the hearing report's findings of fact do not support the
conclusion that he violated district or statutory prohibitions on corporal
punishment. Pet. Br. at 16. Assuming that's true, it doesn't undermine
Teacher's discipline. The other findings and conclusions regarding Teacher's
conduct-which he does not dispute on appeal-are more than enough to
justify his punishment. And Teacher never argues otherwise.
3
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accused of, or what the applicable law is" because rule R277-515 is so broad
and contains so many standards. Pet. Br. at 15-16.
Teacher's argument is revealing. In essence, he questions how he is
supposed to know the standards governing his profession or how his conduct
violated those standards. In contrast with Teacher's apparent unfamiliarity
with professional expectations, the law requires that "professional educator[s]
shall familiarize [themselves] with professional ethics and [are] responsible
for compliance with applicable professional standards." Utah Admin. Code
R277-515-3(2). And the Board may sanction a licensee who has "exhibited
behavior evidencing unfitness for duty, including immoral, unprofessional, or
incompetent conduct, or other violations of standards of ethical conduct,
performance, or professional competence." Utah Code § 53A-6-501 (2014).
Teacher's conduct-which he does not dispute on appeal-clearly falls within
the scope of that provision. Finding he violated administrative rule R277-515
is not vague or too general. See Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 128-29
(Utah 1983) (permitting osteopathic committee to determine "unprofessional
conduct" on a case by case basis because members of that profession can be
held to understand standards of performance of the profession); Johnson-

Bowles Co. v. Div. of Sec. of Dept. of Commerce of State of Utah, 829 P.2d 101
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding sanction for "dishonest and unethical
activities" had meaning to those within the securities profession); Heinecke v.
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Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Prof'l Licensing, 810 P.2d 459,
466-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding "members of a profession are properly
charged with knowledge of what conduct is inconsistent with their
responsibilities as professionals notwithstanding some lack of precision or
comprehensiveness in the statutes and rules governing their licensure").
Even if Teacher needed more explicit conclusions, reading the rule
quickly reveals which standards his conduct violated. Regardless, the hearing
report does the job for him. Immediately before concluding he "violated the
'vi)

terms of Utah Admin. R. R277-515" the hearing report lists thirteen of the
rule's standards. [R.286-87 .] To be sure, the hearing report does not explicitly
state that Teacher violated these provisions but there's no other reasonable
conclusion in context. Why else would these specific standards be recited out
of the "dozens" of other standards the rule contains? Pet. Br. at 15. And the
listed provisions were all identified in the complaint as standards that
Teacher's alleged conduct violated. [R.12-13.] In short, the hearing report
adequately informs Teacher about his offending conduct and the professional
standards he violated.

vJJ

Lastly, Teacher says the hearing report fails to state what presumption
UPPAC applied. Pet. Br. at 16-17. But again, there's no mystery here. The
hearing report adequately informs any reasonably informed person about this
issue. As Teacher admits, Pet. Br. at 17, the initial investigative report states
23
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that the presumed penalty for his alleged offenses-"excessive physical force
or discipline to a child or student"-was a one-to-three-year suspension. [R.5.]
As noted above, the hearing report concludes that at least two of the
complaint allegations had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence
and concludes that the conduct violated several professional standards.
[R.286-87.] The hearing report then discusses mitigating and aggravating
factors, including the Student's vulnerability and the repeated nature of the
conduct. [R.287-88.] Based on all of that, the hearing panel concluded that
"any of these incidents - either the dunking or locking [Student] in a room would constitute a 'single egregious

incident □

of excessive physical force or

discipline,' which would warrant the imposition [of] discipline. The Panel
further concludes that these incidents constitute Drepeated incidents."
[R.288.] "Viewed either as repeated incidents, or single isolated incidents, the
Panel" determined "that discipline should [be] at the high end of the
suggested range." [R.288.] The panel then recommended that Teacher's
license be suspended for "not less than three (3) years." [R.289.]
It is abundantly clear which presumption the hearing report applied.
There's only one option-the one- to three-year suspension. The investigative
report suggested and quoted it; the hearing report also quotes it ("single
egregious incident □ of excessive physical force or discipline" [R.288]), and it's
the only presumption referring to "excessive physical force or discipline."
24
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[R.401-03.] It's also the only presumption that puts the hearing panel's
recommendation-not less than three years-at the "high end of the
suggested range." [R.288-89.]
Nonetheless, Teacher professes confusion that the panel's
recommendation could somehow refer to the next level of presumed
punishments. [R.17.] That's far-fetched for the reasons just explained but
also because the "three years or more" presumption applies to totally
irrelevant conduct such as physical sexual relationships, convictions, and
providing alcohol or illegal drugs. [R.402.] Teacher also ignores the fact that
when recommending a license suspension, the hearing report is required to
propose "a recommended minimum time period ... after which an educator
may request a reinstatement." Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13(1)(f)(vii)(A)
(emphasis added). Teacher can't fault the hearing panel for complying with
controlling rules.
In sum, the hearing report follows the applicable rules and thoroughly
Ji)

outlines Teacher's problematic conduct and the professional standards he
violated.

B.

Teacher's license is suspended for "not less than" 3 years.

Teacher likewise argues that minutes from UPPAC's report-approval
meeting are inconsistent with UPPAC's disciplinary recommendation to the
Board. Pet. Br. at 18. But quibbling about possible inconsistencies in
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UPPAC's recommendation is pointless. They're just recommendations. Only
the Board can impose discipline, and it's the Board's decision that gets
reviewed on appeal. See Utah Code § 53A-6-307(2)(a)-(b) (stating the Board
"shall take final action" on an educator's license and an "entity other than the
board may not take final action" on an educator license"); id. § 53A-6307(3)(b) (an "educator may file a petition for judicial review of the board's
final action"); see also Par Elec. v. Labor Comm'n, 2017 UT App 169,

,r 25,

405 P .3d 842 (a party cannot appeal part of an administrative law judge's
decision that was not adopted by the commission).
The letter informing Teacher of his suspension stated that the Board
had suspended his license "for a period of not less than three (3) years, with
conditions." [R.293.] The Board used the same term-"not less than"-on the
"notification of invalidation of educator license" form included with the letter.
[R.295.] Both documents emphasize that Teacher's reinstatement is not
automatic; rather he must successfully complete the license reinstatement
process. [R.293,295.] For that reason, the Board cannot simply suspend
Teacher (or anyone else) for a set period of time because it suggests an
automatic end to the suspension once the designated time period expires.
Teacher's suspension will last at least three years but it may last longer
depending on his ability to become reinstated.
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There's nothing confusing about the Board's discipline. The terms of
Teacher's suspension are plainly spelled out in the letter, and the
reinstatement process the letter mentions is outlined in the Administrative
Code. Utah Admin. Code R277-213-2. After three years are up, Teacher may
attempt the reinstatement process. But because his suspension will not
automatically end after three years, the Board properly suspended his license
for "not less than" three years.

C.

The superintendent's review did not violate any rules or
due process.

Teacher next asserts that the superintendent violated an
administrative rule because UPPAC filed a response to Teacher's request for
review and violated due process because Teacher didn't file a reply before the
superintendent issued her decision. Pet. Br. at 19-20. These arguments fail.
UPPAC's response brief did not violate any rules. Indeed, the rule in
question says nothing---one way or the other-about response briefs. Utah
Admin. Code R277-212-13(6). In relevant part, the rule simply says that (1)
either party "may request review by the Superintendent" (2) by filing a
"request for review" containing the appellant's name, position, and address,
(.J

the issue being appealed, and the appellant's or the appellant's
representative's signature, and that (3) the superintendent's review "is
limited to a question of fairness or a violation of due process." Id. R277-212-
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13(6)(a)-(c). It's hard to see how UPPAC's response brief violated that rule.
It's even harder to understand why Teacher thinks he can file something not
expressly mentioned by the rules (i.e., a request for review containing
substantive arguments about the issues presented) but UPPAC can't (i.e., a
response to Teacher's arguments).
Indeed, Teacher's interpretation of the rule-allowing only the
appellant to present argument-raises serious due process concerns, lacks
any textual support, and would lead to absurd results. It must be rejected.

See, e.g., Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48,

,r,r 10, 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (statutes

must be interpreted according to their plain language and where two
plausible constructions exist the court should avoid any interpretation that
leads to absurd consequences).
Likewise, Teacher's token due process argument must be rejected.
Teacher cites no case, and the Board is not aware of one, holding that the
state or federal constitutions guarantee the right to a reply brief. If Teacher
were right, UPPAC would presumably have the right to a sur-reply, and so on
and so on in a never-ending chain of constitutionally-guaranteed reply briefs.
In reality, as Teacher notes, due process actually guarantees an opportunity
to be heard. Pet. Br. at 20 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)).
Teacher's request for review asserting substantive arguments satisfied that
right. He offers no meaningful constitutional analysis showing that due
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process entitled him to something more. To seriously advance his novel
constitutional right, Teacher must do more than rely on due process
platitudes and speculation. Pet. Br. at 20; see, e.g., Neese v. Bd. of Pardons
~

and Parole, 2017 UT 89, ,I 67, 854 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 ("We agree with the
dissent that this court should look to the original meaning of the Utah
Constitution when properly confronted with constitutional issues."); Am.

Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ,I 12, 140 P .3d 1235 ("in
interpreting the Utah Constitution, prior case law guides us to analyze its
text, historical evidence of the state of the law when it was drafted, and
Utah's particular traditions at the time of drafting"). Because Teacher never
provides this analysis, his argument must be rejected.

D.

~

Teacher fails to show any harm from the alleged rules
violations.

Even if Teacher's arguments were valid (and they are not), they still
fail to warrant remand or reversal. To prevail, Teacher must do more than
show merely that the agency failed to follow its own rules or violated due
process. He has to prove that the errors were "prejudicial-that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error[s] affected the outcome of the

~

proceedings." In re P.D., 2013 UT App 162, 111, 306 P.3d 817 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson, 2013 UT 53, ,I 38.
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Here, Teacher fails to show that any of the alleged procedural errors
were harmful. In particular, he does not and cannot show that the result-a
three-year suspension-would have been any different absent the alleged
errors. See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that agency's failure to follow
its own procedures denied him due process because, in part, plaintiff failed
"to establish how these procedural errors were harmful, e.g., he did not have
time to prepare for the hearing or, how these procedures would have resulted
in a different outcome absent such errors"); see also State in Interest of A.R.,
2017 UT App 153,

,1

33-34, 402 P.3d 206 (rejecting plaintiffs due process

arguments because she failed to explain how the alleged errors "affected the
[lower] court's decision" or "affected the outcome of the trial"); Hugoe v.

Woods Cross City, 2013 UT App 278,

if 9,

316 P.3d 979 (noting plaintiffs

failure to explain how the alleged procedural error harmed him); In re P.D.,
2013 UT App 162,

if 1 l(noting appellant's burden to show that due process

violation "ultimately impacted the outcome of the proceedings"); Yardley v.

Utah Dep't of Corr., 2006 UT App 49, 2006 WL 350203, *2 (unpublished)
(characterizing agency's failure to follow normal procedures as "harmless
error" and noting lack of evidence that other alleged due process violation
caused any harm or resulted in fundamental unfairness).
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~

Teacher's conclusory protestations to the contrary do not suffice. State

in Interest of A.R., 2017 UT App 153, ,I 33. And he cannot try to meet his
burden by raising new harm arguments for the first time in his reply brief.

Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ,I 14, 263 P.3d 520.

II.
~

Teacher's Arguments About the Employee Discipline Test Are
Wrong or Not Preserved.
Teacher argues that his suspension fails an employee discipline test he

borrows from other contexts because of the hearing report's _alleged
inadequacies and UPPAC's discovery responses prior to the hearing. Pet. Br.
at 21-25. But the test he uses doesn't apply to the Board, and even if it did,
Teacher's arguments that his discipline fails the test are wrong. And he failed
to preserve his argument that UPPAC's discovery responses hindered his
arguments.
vJ

A

The Employee Discipline Test does not apply to Board
disciplinary decisions.

Teacher incorrectly asserts that the Board is bound by a two-part test
requiring Board discipline to be proportional and consistent with previous
sanctions ("Employee Discipline Test"). Pet. Br. at 21. To be sure, most
appellate courts have scrutinized public employee discipline cases to
determine whether the discipline was both consistent with previous sanctions
and proportionate. See e.g., Burgess v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 UT App 186, ,I 35,
405 P.3d 937; West Valley City v. Coyle, 2016 UT App 149, ,I 29, 380 P.3d 327.
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But even in the employment context, the Utah Supreme Court has held the
Employee Discipline Test is not necessarily applicable. Nelson, 2013 UT 53,

1

29 & n.25. Rather, courts must look to the statutory or regulatory language to
determine the scope of its review. Id.

1 29. Thus, in Nelson, the Supreme

Court held the correct statutory test was whether the agency abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority, not the Employee Discipline Test. Id.
Along these same lines, consistency has been a statutory or regulatory
requirement in many of the cases where the court applied the Employee
Discipline Test. See, e.g., Lucas, 949 P.2d at 762 ("Both the Commission's and
the Department's rules ... require that any discipline be administered fairly
and consistently."); Kelly v. Salt Lake Civ. Serv. Comm 'n, 2000 UT App 235, ,I
28, 8 P.3d 1048 (stating department's ·own policies contained consistency
requirement similar to that imposed by the UAPA); see also Utah Code §
63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii) (listing consistency as a relevant standard of judicial
review for cases subject to UAPA); Sorge v. Office of Atty. Gen., 2006 UT App
2, 117, 128 P.3d 566 (stating review of state employment decisions by career
service review board is subject to UAPA). Even the criminal case cited by
Teacher based its application of the consistency factor on its interpretation of
a statutory requirement. LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, 11 21-24, 30, 41, 337
P.3d 254 (applying a consistency and proportionality test case because the
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aggravated kidnapping statute required the court to analyze whether the
sentence was "in the interests of justice").
Here, Teacher concludes that the Board adopted the Employee
Discipline Test because the Utah Code says the Board is authorized to "take
other action it finds to be appropriate for and consistent with the educator's
behavior." Utah Code § 53A-6-501(5)(a)(vii). But this provision doesn't
support his argument.
First, it's not clear the current version of the statute applies. The
conduct for which Teacher was disciplined occurred primarily during the
2014-15 school year. [R.271-84.] But the statutory language he relies on did
not become effective until July 1, 2015. 2015 Utah Laws 1710, 1712-13. The
statute in place in 2014 instead required only that the Board take
"appropriate action." Utah Code § 53A-6-501(1)(i)(a) (2014) (authorizing
Board to take "appropriate action" against an educator who has been found to
have exhibited unprofessional conduct or other behavior in violation of
"standards of ethical conduct, performance, or professional competence"); id.§
53A-6-50l(l)(d) (2014) (authorizing the board to take a range of actions,
including, among other things, a suspension or revocation or "other action
which the board finds to be appropriate after a review of the UPPAC findings
and recommendations."). The 2014 statute did not mention consistency at all.
Further, the 2014 code granted the Board substantial authority, also
33
...,)
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providing that "[n]othing in this chapter limits or abrogates the power of the
board to issue or revoke licenses, hold hearings, or otherwise carry out its
functions." Id. § 53A-6-307 (2014).
Second, even if the current statute applies, it does not impose the
Employee Discipline Test's consistency requirement. The text Teacher relies
on is the last item after a list of possible disciplinary actions-including
suspension-that the Board may impose. Utah Code § 53A-6-501(5)(a)(vii).
Read in context, the provision permits the Board to fashion a nonenumerated penalty based on an educator's behavior if the Board, in its
discretion, determines none of the enumerated sanctions fit. It is not a
general standard governing all Board disciplinary actions.
And even if the current provision confined all disciplinary actions, it
requires only that discipline be "appropriate for and consistent with the

educator's behavior," id., not with other Board disciplinary actions. If
anything, the provision shows the Board has great flexibility in setting an
appropriate sanction in any given circumstance. In sum, a plain language
reading of the provision in context doesn't impose Teacher's Employee
Discipline Test on Board disciplinary decisions.
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B.
v.J

Teacher does not show the Board's decision fails the
Employee Discipline Test, even if it applied.

Assuming the Employee Discipline Test applies, Teacher fails to show
that his suspension doesn't hold up.
He first argues that it is impossible to determine whether his
suspension satisfies the proportionality prong because the hearing report
vJ

fails to identify his offense or the applicable presumption. Pet. Br. at 22.
That's wrong as explained above. The hearing report specifically identified
thirteen professional standards Teacher violated, and readily identifies-by
quoting from it-the only plausibly applicable presumption. [R.286-88.]
Teacher's failure to address those realities means he has waived any further
proportionality argument. And he makes no other attempt, n~r could he, to
argue that a three-year suspension is somehow inappropriate given the
seriousness of his unprofessional conduct.
Teacher then argues that the Board's failure to create and keep teacher
discipline summaries (prior to 2016), and to provide those comparators to
respondents like him, "necessarily" means the Board is applying the wrong
standards, it has no way to determine whether its sanctions are consistent,
and its disciplinary decisions will always be arbitrary. Pet. Br. at 25. But his
conclusions don't "necessarily" follow from the premise. UPPAC never said it
has no records or knowledge of past disciplinary proceedings; it simply told
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Teacher that it had no ready-made summaries of prior disciplinary actions
like the summaries it produced for 2016. [R.520.]
More importantly, Teacher's arguments ignore the disciplinary
presumptions, which are "based on past UPPAC and Board actions." [R.401.]
As long as the Board's decisions follow these guidelines, it's disciplinary
actions will presumably be consistent over time and across educators.
(Notably, Teacher does not challenge the presumptions as arbitrary or
inconsistent or not reflective of past disciplinary actions).

C.

Teacher failed to preserve his arguments about UPPAC
discovery responses.

Teacher blames his failure to show any inconsistency on UPPAC. Pet.
Br. at 25. He argues that he requested detailed discovery for the past three
years about any similar Board disciplinary actions, but UPPAC produced
only brief discipline summaries for 2016. Pet. Br. at 24-25. Teacher followed
up with UPPAC counsel asking for similar 2014 and 2015 summaries. Id.
UPPAC responded that it did not have summaries for those years. Id.
Teacher says UPPAC's 2016 summary gave "very little detail or
explanation" and was "far narrower than [his] request." Pet. Br. at 24-25. Yet
Teacher apparently liked the information enough that he still asked for more
of the same for 2014 and 2105. Id. And when UPPAC said it didn't have more
summaries like that, Teacher dropped the matter.
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~

He now claims the lack of adequate discovery responses prevents him
~

from making a consistency argument. Even if that were true, it's his own
fault because he never raised this discovery issue with the UPPAC hearing
officer as required by controlling precedent. Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
2009 UT 71, ,I 32, 222 P.3d 55 (failure to raise issue during administrative
proceedings precludes judicial review of that issue).
The statement of issues in Teacher's brief says he preserved this issue
but points only to his discovery requests, the agency's response, and counsels'
email exchange. Pet. Br. at 2-3. None of those materials show he raised the
issue before the UPPAC hearing officer to formally object or compel adequate
l.&b

discovery responses. His failure to preserve is all the more glaring because
Teacher did seek to compel production of other unrelated discovery about
school district witnesses. [R.180, 515.]
Teacher cannot now complain on appeal about an issue that could have
been resolved by the hearing officer but was not because Teacher never
raised it. 4 ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT 36, ,I 11, 211

Nor did Teacher raise this issue in his request for review to the
superintendent. Instead, he argued that the hearing report failed to identify
the suggested range of discipline or explain why discipline should be at the
high end of the range. [R.319.] He then argued-in two sentences-that "the
Panel was required to base its recommendation on UPPAC's disciplinary
practices. Yet the Panel failed to cite to any previous disciplinary proceedings
or practices that guided its decision." [Id.] This is a far cry, and qualitatively
4

..rJ
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P .3d 382 ("the preservation rule applies when the issue raised on appeal
could have been resolved in the administrative setting''); Badger v. Brooklyn

Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) ("It is well settled that persons
aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies may not, by refusing or
neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them, and call
upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable originally by
such agencies.").
Teacher failed to preserve this discovery-related issue. The Court may
not address it now. State ex rel. E.R., 2001 UT App 66,

1 9, 21 P.3d 680

(failure to timely raise discovery issues precludes appellate review).

D.

If Teacher preserved the discovery issue, the Board agrees
to produce some comparator information on limited
remand.

The Board disputes the application of the Employee Discipline Test to
its proceedings (or this Court's review of them) and Teacher hasn't shown
that his suspension fails that test. Teacher also failed to preserve his
discovery complaints at the hearing. But if this Court concludes that Teacher
preserved this issue, the Board recognizes that consistency has some
relevance to its disciplinary decisions. In Nelson, for example, the Supreme
Court recognized that consistency is relevant to determine whether the

different, from his current argument that he couldn't argue inconsistency
because the agency didn't adequately respond to his discovery requests.
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agency abused its discretion. 2013 UT 53, if 30. It does not follow, though,
that agencies are completely bound by past actions. An agency can still
impose inconsistent discipline if it has a fair and rational basis for doing so.

See Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, if 31 ("Meaningful disparate treatment can only
be found when similar factual circumstances led to a different result without
explanation."); Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 190-91 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing UAPA permits DOPL to impose inconsistent
discipline if it has a "fair and rational basis for the inconsistency.").
Because consistency may be relevant to this Court's review of the
Board's discretion, Teacher should have been able to discover at least some
comparator information and raise a consistency argument during Board
proceedings. Thus, if Teacher's consistency argument was not waived, the
Board recognizes that its decision must be reversed and this matter
remanded.
This does not mean, however, that Teacher is entitled to discover every
piece of evidence he requested. He asked for the en_tire case and evidence files
for every other teacher disciplined for similar conduct. [R.30.] This
encompasses a large amount of information. The case file contains "the
original notification of misconduct with supporting documentation,
correspondence with the Executive Secretary, the investigative report, any
stipulated discipline agreement, the hearing report, and the final disposition
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of the case." Utah Admin. Code R277-210-2(51). The evidence files are even
larger. They contain all "materials, written or otherwise, obtained by the
UPPAC investigator" during the initial investigation and all correspondence
between the investigator and counsel. Utah Admin. Code R277-210-2(52).
Teacher does not need all of that. As he admits, the comparator
information functions more like precedential case law. Pet. Br. at 23-24. And
the reason Teacher needs that information during discovery is because there
are no published cases and the information is not otherwise publicly
available. Id. But the information Teacher requested (including
correspondence, supporting documentation, and all materials and evidence
gathered in an investigation) greatly exceeds what is found in case precedent.
That much information would also be burdensome to produce and could never
all be admitted in a hearing.
Instead, Teacher needs only the factual findings, the final discipline,
and the Board's reasoning. The investigative report, the stipulated
agreement or hearing report, and the Board's final disposition contain all
that information. Those documents would give Teacher more than enough to
argue consistency and make a record for this Court's review. Moreover,
Teacher does not necessarily need information for every "boundary violation"
case, but rather only those that involve discipline for similar behavior.
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~

A limited remand for discovery of comparator information does not
mean that the entire hearing process must be redone. Teacher has not
disputed the factual findings. If Teacher wants to make a consistency
argument after he reviews the comparator information, that can be resolved
through briefing and a hearing before a UPPAC hearing officer limited to
what discipline would be appropriate considering the comparators. That
information can then be considered with the existing factual findings and
UPPAC can issue a new hearing report. That report can then be reviewed by
0P

the Board as contemplated in the Board's rules. Utah Admin. Code R277-21213.

III. Addressing the Superintendent's Review Process Would Be
an Advisory Opinion.
Teacher asks the Court to provide "guidance on the role of an appeal to
the superintendent." Pet. Br. at 26. But the clarification he seeks would have
no meaningful impact on the present dispute and would amount to an
advisory opinion on issues not in dispute. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004
UT 14,

,r 22, 86 P .3d 735; see also Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75,
UT 5,

,r 19, 289 P.3d 582; Clegg, 2010

,r 26.
For example, Teacher asks the court to clarify whether the

superintendent's review is necessary. Pet. Br. at 26. That's a moot point
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because Teacher did appeal to the superintendent. There is no reason for the
Court to reach this issue and any decision on it would be advisory.
Teacher's concerns are also not supported by the language of the
statute or the rules. The administrative rules do not require a review by the
superintendent. They provide that Teacher "may'' request review for limited
purposes. Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13(6). And while there are some cases
that indicate the term "may" might be mandatory for exhaustion purposes,
they involve an appeal to the final decision maker. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 904 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding
party had to seek a formal agency adjudication even though statute said
either party "may" seek such an adjudication). Here, the superintendent is
not the final decision maker. Her review is limited to issues of "fairness and
due process." Utah Admin. Code R277-212-13(6)(c). If she finds error, she can
refer the report back to UPPAC for further proceedings or direct UPPAC's
executive secretary to take specific action. Id. She cannot render any final
decision on her own.
Teacher also remarks that the superintendent's decision was
insufficient to provide a reasoned basis for review. Pet. Br. at 26. This might
matter, he says, depending on whose decision this Court reviews. Id. But
under the statute, this Court does not review the superintendent's decision. It
reviews the Board's decision. Utah Code § 53A-6-307 (An "educator may file a
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petition for judicial review of the board's final action"). And the Board
vJ

reviews UPPAC's decision, not the superintendent's. See Utah Admin. Code
R277-212-13(6)(e) (providing that UPPAC report shall be referred to Board
v9

for final disposition after UPPAC completes reconsideration ordered by the
superintendent); id. R277-212-13(7), (8) (describing Board actions if it
approves or disapproves of the UPPAC hearing report). Moreover, in this
case, the superintendent merely declined to refer the matter back to the
hearing officer. [R.404.] The matter then went to the Board to review the
UPPAC decision. Utah Admin. Code R.277-212-13(7). The Board's final
decision did not adopt or refer to the superintendent's decision at all. There is
no reason or authority for this Court to review the superintendent's decision.
To the extent it was not sufficient, that error was harmless.
By raising this issue now, Teacher apparently wants this Court to
address his complaint that the superintendent's review is "a waste of the
educator's resources." Pet. Br. at 46. But that is not a proper ground for
appeal. Nor can the Court change or strike administrative rules simply
because the parties do not like them or because the court would have enacted
different ones. Cf. Schroeder Investments, L.C. v. Edwards, 2013 UT 25, ,I 25,
301 P.3d 994 ("We are bound by the policy judgments of the legislature-even
if we fundamentally disagree with them."). That is the relief requested by

Teacher's third point on appeal, and this Court need not reach it.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Board's decision.
But if the Court concludes that Teacher preserved his discovery argument,
the Court should reverse and remand for further discovery and proceedings
regarding consistency as outlined above.

Respectfully submitted,

Isl Erin T. Middleton
Erin T. Middleton

Attorney for Respondent
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